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AXIARCHISM AND SELECTORS
John Russell Roberts
This essay offers a defense of Axiarchism’s answer to the question, “Why does 
the world exist?” against prominent objections leveled against it by Derek 
Parfit. Parfit rejects the Axiarchist answer while abstracting from it his own 
Selector strategy. I argue that the abstraction fails, and that even if we were 
to regard Axiarchism as an instance of a Selector hypothesis, we should re-
gard it as the only viable one. I also argue that Parfit’s abstraction leads him 
to mistake the nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism’s claim to being 
an ultimate explanation. Finally, I defend the Axiarchist’s claim that the good 
could not fail to rule.
We may be said to account for a thing when we shew 
that it is so best.
—Berkeley
In “Why Anything? Why This?,” Derek Parfit evaluates a number of can-
didate answers to the title’s questions, i.e., “Why does anything at all exist 
and why, out of all the vast number of possible universes, is this the one 
that exists?”1 Among the answers examined, one plays a pivotal role in 
the essay: Axiarchism. Though Parfit rejects the Axiarchist’s answer, he 
abstracts from it what he thinks is a promising explanatory strategy in-
volving what he calls “Selectors.” In the following, I will argue that the 
Axiarchist’s answer cannot be abstracted so as to open the door to Parfit’s 
other Selectors. Moreover, if we regard Axiarchism as an instance of a 
Selector hypothesis, we should regard it as the only one with promise. 
In addition, I will argue that Parfit’s abstraction leads him to mistake the 
nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism’s claim to being an ultimate 
explanation. Finally, I will defend the Axiarchist’s claim that the good 
could not fail to rule and offer an assessment of where the debate between 
Parfit and the Axiarchist stands in light of that defense.
1The essay first appeared in The London Review of Books 20, no. 3, February 1998. It is 
reprinted as “Appendix D” in Parfit’s On What Matters, vol. 2 (Oxford and New: OUP, 2011), 
623–648. 
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Abstracting Axiarchism
In brief, Axiarchism is the view that the world exists because it is good 
that it exist. That is to say, the world exists because it ought to, where the 
“ought” is the ethical “ought.”2 Is this, in the end, a fundamentally dif-
ferent claim from the more familiar view that the world exists because it 
is good, but is brought into existence by the power of a divine personal 
agent? No quick answer is available. On the one hand, the leading con-
temporary exponent of Axiarchism, John Leslie, sees it and theism as 
enjoying a rather friendly relationship. He suggests that God, as the per-
fect being, may be what is immediately required by the principle, and 
then in turn God would be responsible for creating everything else.3 Other 
proponents, however, insist that Axiarchism does not appeal to an agent 
of any kind, but rather to something abstract in nature. Nicholas Rescher, 
another prominent advocate, insists that his version of Axiarchism, what 
he calls, “Axiogenesis,” invites “[n]o such anthropomorphism.” As he sees 
it, “[th]e real emerges from the manifold of possibility, a modus operandi 
that is altogether natural.”4 Then again, there is a long tradition of Chris-
tian Platonism—ultimately inspired by Plato and Plotinus, but much of it 
travelling through the Christian Neoplantonist Pseudo-Dionysius—that 
is deeply inspired by axiarchic considerations. Some in this tradition see 
Axiarchism as providing insight into God’s basic nature and the nature of 
divine power. The most deliberate development of this idea is to be found, 
I believe, in Ralph Cudworth’s work, where he attempts to use axiarchism 
to give an account of the nature of personal agency, both human and 
Divine.5 Regardless, Parfit treats Axiarchism as appealing to an abstract 
principle that the best ought to be, not to a personal agent. Consequently, 
for the purposes of this paper, we will just assume that this is correct.
Despite the fact that Axiarchism is at least as old as Plato and has ex-
erted a profound influence throughout most of our philosophical history, 
philosophers now are typically dismissive of it. Parfit, however, is not. As 
2John Leslie offers a version of this kind of Axiarchism. My presentation of the view here 
is deeply indebted to his. See his Value and Existence (Totowa, NJ: Roman and Littlefield, 
1979). However, I should not be read as presenting Leslie’s own views; any short-comings in 
my exposition of Axiarchism or in its defense are entirely my own. 
3His view has changed somewhat more recently. He now thinks that it doesn’t affect what 
one actually believes, whether “God” is taken to be the name of a creative force of ethical 
requirement or the name for whatever one thinks owes its existence to such a force. See 
Chapter 5 of Infinite Minds (New York: Oxford, 2001). However, Leslie is more often inter-
preted as actually advocating that it is abstract Platonic entities that are responsible for the 
world’s existence. See, most recently, Timothy O’Connor’s discussion in Theism and Ultimate 
Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 76–77.
4Axiogenesis: An Essay in Metaphysical Optimalism (Totowa, NJ: Roman and Littlefield 
2010), 140.
5See his True Intellectual System of the Universe (Andover: Gould and Newman 1838), 
passim. This approach, which seeks to identify the Good (axiarchically conceived) with the 
traditional conception of God, has the advantage of being able to cite God as the truth-maker 
for Axiarchism’s claims that such and such is best. Leslie’s approach might also allow this, 
but it is more difficult to assess. 
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he sees it, there is some explanatory power here, but it needs to be honed 
in on. To this end, he breaks the view down into three claims:
(1) It would be best if reality were a certain way.
(2) Reality is that way.
(3) (1) explains (2).6
Neither (1) nor (2) is unique to Axiarchism and it is clear enough what 
they are claiming. (3), the claim that (2) is true because of (1), is Axiarchism’s 
distinctive claim and so he proposes that we simply allow both (1) and (2) 
so as to focus on it. But (3) poses a challenge. What sense of “because” is 
the Axiarchist appealing to in claiming that the world exists because it is 
good? Despite the apparent difficulty of understanding the nature of the 
explanation offered by (3), Parfit advises that we not be too quick to write 
it off. After all, we are seeking an answer to an extraordinary question, an 
explanation for the whole of reality. It’s not unreasonable to suspect that 
the answer itself might be extraordinary in some way. If we hope to make 
progress here, we should keep an open mind.
With this in view, Parfit then attempts to extract what he takes to be the 
valuable aspect of the Axiarchist’s explanatory strategy.
Axiarchism might be expressed as follows. We are now supposing that of all 
the ways that the whole of reality might be, one is both the very best, and 
is the way that reality is. On the Axiarchist View, that is no coincidence. This 
claim, I believe, makes sense.7
That is not to say that he accepts the Axiarchist’s answer. Axiarchism’s 
(3) can only be the explanation of the world’s existence if the world does, 
in fact, possess the characteristic of being the best. Parfit rejects the view 
not because of (3) but because of (2). There is just too much seemingly 
pointless suffering in the world for it to be true that value rules. How-
ever, for the sake of assessing the explanatory value of Axiarchism, Parfit 
simply allows that this is the best of all possible worlds.8
It should be mentioned at this point that any Axiarchist will readily 
agree that the presence of evil in this world, or even just anything less 
than the best, is both the most obvious and the most serious challenge 
the view faces. But we should also note that there is a long, rich, and (we 
might add) still developing history of theistic responses to the problem of 
evil that Axiarchists can and do adapt for their own purposes. Naturally, 
Parfit’s objection would have to deal with these to be successful. But set 
this aside. We will return to it at the very end of the paper.
Instead, let’s focus on Parfit’s suggestion that in Axiarchism we get an 
instance of a general explanatory strategy with some promise. To draw it 
6Parfit, On What Matters, 633.
7Ibid., 633–634.
8N.B., the Axiarchic claim under consideration here is not that their view is more plau-
sible and therefore it’s more likely that ours is the best of all worlds. 
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out, we just need to “abstract from the optimism of the Axiarchist View.”9 
That gives us this:
Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one both has some very special feature, 
and is the possibility that obtains. That is no coincidence. This possibility 
obtains because it has this feature.10
Parfit then reviews a number of hypotheses that fit this form of expla-
nation. For instance, one such very special feature might be Maximality. 
Suppose the world is such that it allows for the greatest number of pos-
sible beings to be actual. Well, if reality is, in fact, as full as possible, then 
it might be no coincidence that both these things are true. The suggestion 
is that the most full world might exist precisely because it has this feature. 
Maximality would then be a “Selector.” So, according to Maximality, there 
is a fundamental principle that “being possible and part of the fullest way 
that reality could be, is sufficient for being actual.”11 In this sense, the 
world would exist because it was “selected” for this feature. Or to go in the 
opposite direction, if it were the case that nothing existed, then that might 
be no coincidence. Leibniz believed just plain nothingness would be the 
simplest of possibilities.12 So, on this, the Null View, perhaps Simplicity 
would be the Selector. Accordingly, the Null hypothesis would appeal to 
a fundamental principle to the effect that being the simplest possibility is 
enough for being actual. Of course, we know the Null hypothesis to be 
false. Maybe the Maximality hypothesis has legs. But so may other Selec-
tors. Each will have to be judged on its merits. Regardless, the upshot 
is that the abstraction from Axiarchism has yielded a potentially viable 
explanatory approach to the question, “Why does the world exist?”.
Why the Abstraction Fails
The problem Parfit faces is that abstracting from Axiarchism in this way 
abstracts away all the explanatory power. If we allow that Axiarchism is 
a Selector hypothesis then we should regard it as the only one with any 
promise.
Recall Parfit’s simplification of the Axiarchist’s answer:
(1) It would be best if reality were a certain way.
(2) Reality is that way.
(3) (1) explains (2).
According to what Parfit tells us, the abstracted version would be:
9Parfit, On What Matters, 634
10Ibid.
11Ibid., 636.
12G. W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” 7, in Philosophical 
Essays, ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 210. 
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(4) Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one has some very special fea-
ture.
(5) Reality is that way.
(6) (4) explains (5).
I take it from this that Parfit intends (1) and (1*) to be equivalent.
(1*) Of all the countless cosmic possibilities, one has the very special 
feature of being the best that could exist.
But this way of wording it masks the vital core of the Axiarchist’s 
answer, because the wording of (1*) masks what’s so special about Axi-
archism’s special feature by mimicking the form of a merely descriptive 
claim. But, of course, the Axiarchist is making use of the claim that the 
best ought to exist. According to Axiarchism, (1) is an evaluative claim that 
is more perspicuously expressed by (1**),
(1**) Of all the cosmic possibilities, one has the very special feature of 
being the one that ought to exist.13
Therein lies the heart of the Axiarchist explanatory strategy. The reason 
Plato, Plotinus and so many others looked to the ethical realm to explain 
why the world exists is because there is an intrinsic connection between 
goodness and being. Maximality, Simplicity, Mathematical Elegance, what 
have you, might qualify as special in some sense of “special,” but only the 
good is special in the relevant way.
To see this, it helps to see that the Axiarchist is exploiting three points. 
First, ethical facts are necessary. God could no more make benevolence evil, 
or wanton cruelty good, than He could make a round square.14 Second, 
these necessary ethical facts are, if you will, directed to being. For contrast, 
consider another necessary claim, such as that if there are three cats and 
they are joined by four more cats, there will be seven cats.15 While per-
fectly necessary, that fact says nothing at all about the existence of those 
cats, one way or the other. But the necessary ethical facts have a built-in 
connection with existence. The good should be. And the bad should not 
be. The best world should exist. The worst world should not exist. Third, 
ethical claims aren’t just directed to being, they make demands on it. They 
say things must be a certain way; it is necessary for them to be a certain 
way. The best world must exist. The worst world must not. This necessity is, 
of course, ethical necessity, but the Axiarchist’s admittedly extraordinary 
proposal, the part addressed to our extraordinary question, is the claim 
13Parfit is, of course, perfectly well aware of the fact that (1) is an evaluative claim. He 
explicitly identifies it as such. (On What Matters, 633). My claim is that the abstracting process 
seems to have served to obscure the importance of this point as Parfit’s discussion proceeds.
14Axiarchism is, of course, predicated upon the falsity of voluntarism.
15The example is just a variation on of one of Leslie’s. See Immortality Defended (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) 34.
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that perhaps it is a metaphysical necessity that this ethical demand itself is 
creatively efficacious.16 However extraordinary that claim is, the key point 
is that it is based upon a real, intrinsic connection between Axiarchism’s 
choice of a Selector, and a necessity for something to exist. And necessity, at 
least some kind of necessity, is presumably what we want.17 We are, after 
all, looking for an ultimate explanation of why the world exists. We don’t 
want to leave room for any why-questions to linger about.18
With that in mind, contrast Axiarchism’s answer with, for instance,
Maximality’s Selector and its filling in of (4).
(M) Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one is as full as possible,
and Maximality’s Fundamental Principle,
(MFP) The world must be as full as possible.
One immediately wants to know what the Maximalist proposes is the 
intrinsic connection between (M) being the fullest world and, (MFP), the 
necessity for such a world to exist? No answer is forthcoming. Maximal-
ity’s Selector, the feature of being as full as possible, says nothing one way 
or the other about the existence of that world. It only tells us something 
about its denizens; it simply tells us that if it exists, there are as many 
as possible. Nothing about this feature tells us why this world would 
exist. The same goes for the other Selectors. That a world is, for instance, 
the Most Mathematically Elegant, tells us nothing about why this world 
would exist rather than nothing, let alone why this world would exist 
rather than some other. And it certainly tells us nothing about the ne-
cessity for this world to exist. The other Selectors simply don’t carry an 
intrinsic reason for being with them. No other Selector has Axiarchism’s 
natural connection with the necessity for something to exist. Consequently, 
Axiarchism would seem to be the only Selector which brings to the table 
anything resembling the kind of explanatory power we are looking for.
So much then for my first objection; Axiarchism is the only Selector 
hypothesis with any promise.
16The proposal is not that “creative necessity” and “ethical necessity” mean the same 
thing or that they can be shown through analysis that they do. The necessity in question 
is not simply the function of the meaning of words; it is a substantive metaphysical claim. 
17Although it is not a concern that Parfit raises, it might be objected that while this 
provides motivation to take the Axiarchic step, it also undercuts it. If the Axiarchist is 
right, the creative efficacy of the ethical is a necessity. In which case, isn’t only the best truly 
possible? Won’t this produce modal collapse, leaving us with the Spinozistic conclusion 
that the best is the only possible world? That may be. And it may be that the Axiarchist 
is best off simply setting about making that consequence more palatable. I think that may 
not be necessary, but because this issue falls outside of Parfit’s concerns, I will not pursue 
it farther here.
18Whether we have the right kind of necessity to put a satisfying end to the relevant 
why-questions is taken up in the last two parts of the essay where we consider, respectively, 
Axiarchism’s claim to ultimacy and the question of whether or not the Axiarchic principle 
must rule.
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Axiarchism and Ultimacy
My second objection grows out of the first in the sense that it seems that 
mislocating the source of Axiarchism’s explanatory power is what leads 
Parfit to mistake the nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism’s claim 
to being an ultimate explanation.
Consider one of Parfit’s other Selectors. Again, let’s use Maximality. If 
that explanatory possibility obtains, then this world is the fullest and it 
was selected for this feature. But we can then ask, why does this explana-
tory possibility obtain rather than some other, say, Simplicity? Of course, 
it might just be a brute fact that it obtains. But, Parfit argues, it need not 
be. It could be that this explanatory possibility obtains because it has some 
feature which explains why it obtains.19 In other words, it may itself have 
been selected by some higher-order Selector possibility. Perhaps Maxi-
mality was selected because it produces the greatest variety of beings. In 
that case, Variety is the higher Selector principle. We now face the pos-
sibility of a regress of explanatory principles. But Parfit’s view is that this 
doesn’t mean that we haven’t made some progress. After all, if we knew 
Maximality to be true, then we would have some explanation of why the 
world exists, but the regress of explanatory possibilities means that we 
don’t have an ultimate explanation.
In response, Axiarchists might claim that their view is immune to this 
concern. Axiarchists tell us that the reason the world exists is because so is 
best. But when we ask why this is the explanatory possibility that obtains, 
they might answer, because that is best. And when we ask, in turn, why this 
explanatory hypothesis obtains we get the answer, because that is best, 
and so on. In this way, we might regard the Axiarchic principle as “self 
validating,” as Nicholas Rescher puts it. But this strategy, Parfit argues, 
won’t work. What we have now is a series of explanatory truths, and so 
now we need an explanation of why this series obtains rather than another 
series or no series at all. The root of the problem, as Parfit sees it, is the 
following.
What could select between these possibilities? Might goodness be the high-
est Selector because that is best, or non-arbitrariness be the Selector because 
that is the least arbitrary possibility? Neither suggestion, I believe, makes 
sense. Just as God could not make himself exist, no Selector could make 
itself the one that, at the highest level, rules. No Selector could settle whether 
it rules, since it cannot settle anything unless it does rule.20
There are a number of important things going on in this passage that 
need to be addressed, but the first thing to say is that I agree that ap-
pealing to a series of Selector principles (Axiarchic or otherwise) will not 
solve the problem. To explain more clearly why, but also why I don’t think 
this point effects Axiarchism’s claim to being an ultimate explanation, I 
19Parfit, On What Matters, 644.
20Ibid..
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believe it will be helpful to note that Parfit’s point here bears an ironic 
resemblance to a point made by the seventeenth-century Axiarchist Ralph 
Cudworth. In his A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 
Cudworth is concerned to refute ethical voluntarism, or as he describes it, 
the view that “all moral good and evil, just and unjust are mere arbitrary 
and factitious things, that are created wholly by will.”21 In the course of 
making his case, he argues that even when it comes to positive laws it is 
not the will of a ruler that obliges one to obey. Because,
laws and commands do not run thus to will that this or that thing shall 
become just or unjust, obligatory or unlawful, or that men shall be obliged 
or obey; but only to require that something be done or not done. . . . For it 
was never heard of that any one founded all his authority of commanding 
others, and others’ obligation or duty to obey his commands, in a law of his 
own making, that men should be required, obliged, or bound to obey him. 
[Because] if it should be imagined that anyone should make a positive law to 
require that others should be obliged or bound to obey him, everyone would 
think such a law ridiculous and absurd. For if they were obliged before, then 
this law would be in vain and to no purpose. And if they were not before 
obliged, then they could not be obliged by any positive law, because they 
were not previously bound to obey such a person’s commands.22
First the resemblance. Then the irony. The resemblance between Cud-
worth’s point and Parfit’s is that in both cases the complaint is that we 
have a boot-strapping problem. In Cudworth’s case, the would-be ruler 
can’t solve his authority problem by issuing a second-order demand that 
his first-order demand ought to be obeyed because then we’ll just want 
to know why we are obliged to obey this second-order demand. The only 
way such a demand would be obligating is if we were already obliged 
to obey his demand. In which case, the second-order demand would be 
superfluous. It wouldn’t serve to validate the first-order demand. And, 
obviously, the problem is not removed by issuing a series of higher-order 
demands. A person cannot make his claim to authority self-validating; 
even an infinite series of demands to rule won’t make one ruler. In Parfit’s 
case the complaint is that the situation is much the same when it comes 
to Selector principles. No principle, not even the Axiarchic principle, can 
be validated by appealing to the same principle only at higher-level. But 
Cudworth’s argument suggests that the situation is even worse than Parfit 
thinks. If the first-order principle needed validation, then it still needs it 
even with a second-order principle in place. The second-order principle is 
entirely impotent. Just as in the case of the would-be ruler’s second-order 
demand, introducing a second-order principle doesn’t even manage to 
push our problem back a step.
21Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (New York: Cam-
bridge, 1996) 18.
22Ibid., 18–19
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Now the irony. The irony lies in the fact that the point of Cudworth’s 
argument is not that this is an unsolvable problem, but that this is a 
problem for the Axiarchist’s arch enemy, the ethical voluntarist. There can 
be binding positive laws because there can be genuine ruling authorities. 
We have such when “natural justice or equity . . . gives to one the right 
or authority of commanding, and begets in another duty and obligation 
to obedience.”23 Justice itself enjoys underived authority. If one’s rule is 
founded upon justice, Cudworth is claiming, then his commands are 
genuinely authoritative, and one is obliged by them.
That’s the magic of the ethical. It’s not that ethical requirements merely 
demand something in the way that I might demand that you bring me my 
coffee. They demand with authority. And that authority is underived. No 
further backing for their right to rule is called for. The Axiarchist prin-
ciple is not “self-validating.” However, we might, if we like, say that the 
question, “Why does the Axiarchic principle rule?” is self-answering. We 
can say it is self-answering in the same way we can say that the question, 
“Why be moral?” is self-answering. To say that question is self-answering 
is not to appeal to a further justifying principle. For instance, it is an ethical 
requirement that you must not cause unnecessary suffering. Of course, it 
is true that if one were to ask, “Why should I do what this ethical require-
ment demands?” we might respond, “Because it would be wrong not to!” 
But it would be delivered with a difficult-to-hide tone of exasperation. The 
exasperation is warranted because you are not answering this illegitimate 
request for justification by offering a second-order principle that gives the 
ethical requirement the power to oblige. You’re answering that illegitimate 
question by trying to get your interlocutor to recognize that it is illegiti-
mate by, however ineffectually, getting them to recognize their natural 
obligation not to cause unnecessary suffering. To adapt Bishop Butler’s 
famous description of conscience, the ethical is “in kind and in nature, 
supreme” and “bears its own authority of being so.”24
The key point here is the reason that generation after generation of 
philosophers have looked to the ethical realm for an ultimate explanation 
of existence is not merely because ethical truths are necessary truths but 
because of the peculiar, non-logical kind of necessity they enjoy. When it 
comes to ethical requirements, their necessity is a function of their natural 
authority. One does not come to recognize the necessity of something such 
as it is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering by coming to recognize that 
its negation implies a contradiction. You come to recognize value’s neces-
sity when you recognize its authority. And what it takes to recognize its 
authority is to recognize that you are obliged by it; you must recognize that 
it does, in fact, rule. Value’s peculiar form of necessity is grounded in its 
natural Sovereignty. The Axiarchist’s idea is then to ground the principle 
23Ibid., 18. 
24Joseph Butler, “Sermon II: Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience,” in The Works 
of Bishop Butler, ed. J. H. Bernard (London and NewYork: Macmillan and Co. 1900) vol. I, 45.
421AXIARCHISM AND SELECTORS
of the world’s existence as the ruling principle upon the kind of necessity 
provided by the natural Sovereignty of the ethical.
When it comes to Axiarchism and Axiarchism alone, there is no call for 
higher-order Selector principles. Therein lies the force of Axiarchism’s claim 
to being an ultimate explanation. Parfit’s abstraction obscures this force.
That Value Cannot Fail and the State of the Debate
Finally, the preceding can be used to defend the claim that not only does 
value rule reality, it could not fail to rule. The good is necessarily effica-
cious. Against this, Parfit objects that that’s hard to believe because “while 
it is inconceivable that undeserved suffering could have failed to be in 
itself bad, it is clearly conceivable that value might have failed to rule, if 
only because it seems so clear that value does not rule.”25
In light of the preceding, I think, this gets the dialectic wrong. Again, 
according to the Axiarchist, value’s peculiar form of necessity is grounded 
in its natural Sovereignty. You recognize the necessity of the ethical by 
recognizing its authority and that means recognizing that you are obliged 
by it; you accept its Sovereignty. So, since Parfit accepts both that unde-
served suffering could not fail to be bad and that Selector hypotheses are 
genuinely explanatory, and since the Axiarchist’s Selector is the only viable 
Selector, the question that seemingly unnecessary suffering raises is, how 
could it be possible for value to fail to rule?26 Parfit will owe the Axiarchist an 
answer to that question. In turn, the Axiarchist will owe Parfit an answer 
to the problem of evil. These strike me as comparably difficult tasks.27
Florida State University
25Parfit, On What Matters, 643–644.
26The Axiarchist, as we know, says that it could not. Value rules necessarily; it is meta-
physically necessary that the best be. So this must be only seemingly unnecessary suffering. 
27I would like to thank David McNaughton, Thomas Flint, and two anonymous referees 
for Faith and Philosophy for their helpful advice and feedback. 
